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Abstract. In this essay, Mason Marshall argues that Plato’s views on Forms play a central role in
his educational philosophy. In response to what certain commentators have recently written, Marshall
contends that this interpretation not only is accurate but also is advantageous because of how it can
help philosophy of education. He also addresses the view, proposed by one philosopher of education,
that Plato believes that the most valuable sort of knowledge cannot be fully expressed in words and that
the objects of this knowledge are something other than transcendent Forms. Preferable to that view,
Marshall argues, is the idea that Plato wants knowledge of Forms which is nonrepresentational.
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To many people, Plato can seem antiquated. One reason for this is his political
views and his treatment of rhetoric and art; most off-putting for many of his readers
is the theory of Forms — understandably, since it can look untenable and strange.
For those of us who want to defend Plato, it is tempting to downplay the theory
of Forms or to try to divorce him from it, as certain commentators in philosophy
of education have done lately.1 I will argue here, however, that it is a mistake
to do so because Plato’s views about Forms play a central role in his educational
thought, and this is for the better rather than the worse.2 For reasons I will
add, especially problematic is one recent interpretation according to which Plato
1. Much as Mark Jonas argues that Plato is neither the intellectualist nor the elitist he has been taken to
be, he holds that Plato posits only immanent forms, meaning, presumably, Aristotelian natural kinds;
following Iris Murdoch, Jonas regards Plato’s talk of transcendent Forms as strictly a metaphor for
“the ethical reality of existence” (Mark E. Jonas, “Three Misunderstandings of Plato’s Theory of Moral
Education,” Educational Theory 66, no. 3 [2016]: 317). Mintz stops short of ascribing a theory of Forms to
Plato and, in a book-length treatment of him, mentions Forms only four times (see Avi I. Mintz, Plato:
Images, Aims, and Practices of Education [Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2018], 29n5, 34, 50). On one
of those occasions, he mentions them in the course of discussing the view that Plato has no doctrines.
Contrast this with Avi I. Mintz, “‘Chalepa Ta Kala,’ ‘Fine Things are Difficult’: Socrates’ Insights into the
Psychology of Teaching and Learning,” Studies in Philosophy and Education 29, no. 3 (2010): 295–296.
2. They play a central role at least in one phase of his educational thought and, thus, in the whole. For
certain scholars known as developmentalists, there were distinct phases of Plato’s thinking, including
one in which he accepted the theory of Forms and a later one in which he abandoned it. My touchstone
herein are four dialogues that many developmentalists have thought he authored during the first of those
two periods — the Phaedo, Phaedrus, Republic, and Symposium — though I bracket the question of
whether developmentalism is true. I do assume that there is a unified set of views that emerges in those
four dialogues such that we can legitimately interpret them in light of one another. To my mind, scholars
such as Lloyd Gerson, Thomas Brickhouse, and Nicholas Smith have replied adequately to the claim that
we must read each of Plato’s dialogues separately from the others. See Lloyd P. Gerson, From Plato to
Platonism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013), 36ff; and Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas
D. Smith, Socratic Moral Psychology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 31–34.
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simultaneously rejects Forms and holds that the most valuable sort of knowledge is
ineffable.
My argument in this essay proceeds as follows: In the first section, I claim
that Plato thinks knowledge of the Forms is the central aim of education. In the
second section, I argue that this view about his posture toward the Forms is not
only accurate, but is also advantageous, because of how it can help philosophy of
education. In the third section, I address the interpretation mentioned previously,
according to which Plato believes in ineffable knowledge but not in Forms.
Throughout this essay, I presume that, whatever else they might be, the Forms
are abstract, immaterial, changeless, flawless, and transcendent. They are flawless
insofar as they never suffer the compresence of opposites, as it is called; for
example, they are never good in some respects yet bad in others (see, for example,
Republic 523b–524d, Symposium 211a–b).3 And they are transcendent inasmuch
as they would continue to be (or, speaking loosely, to exist) even if they were
exemplified by nothing other than themselves.
Plato on the Central Aim of Education
When I say that knowledge of the Forms is, for Plato, the central aim of
education, I mean that, as Plato saw it, equipping people with this knowledge
is the task to focus on if you want them to achieve what is most important —
namely, virtue and happiness.4 In the course of explaining why he thought this, I
will indicate that he had serious reasons for his claims, reasons that perhaps are
not decisive but are substantial enough to be worth considering, as long as he was
correct in believing that there are Forms. In the next section, I will point to a
reason Plato could offer for saying that there are. My discussion in this section,
however, touches on a range of scholarly issues that are significant but that tend
to be distracting, so to address them I will rely heavily on notes.
The first point to make is that, for Plato, knowing and contemplating the Forms
are part of being happy, where happiness is conceived not as contentment, but
as flourishing.5 Plato indicates as much about our relation to the Forms (see, for
3. Herein all references to Plato’s works are to the texts edited by John Burnet and S. R. Slings for the
Oxford Classical Texts series, and all translations are based on the ones in John M. Cooper, ed., Plato:
Complete Works (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1997).
4. This has to be qualified, though only slightly. You equip people with this knowledge insofar as you
lead some of them to it, and then they are guided by it and guide the others, such that the others, too,
are guided by it. In the Republic and maybe also in dialogues such as the Phaedrus (see, for example,
“a proper soul,” at 276e6), the thought is that certain people are unsuited to know
the Forms.
5. Jonas’s main reason for denying that Plato believes in Forms is that they are described in his dialogues
only in the middle of myths and metaphors (see Jonas, “Three Misunderstandings of Plato’s Theory
of Moral Education”). But in the debate among scholars about what status Plato’s myths have, one
defensible and longstanding view is that he believes they convey philosophical truths as much as his
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example, Republic 611d–612a, Symposium 211d), and it is easy enough to see why.
For him, they act as causes (see especially Phaedo 96–106); for example, the Form
of the Good causes the goodness of all the other Forms and everything else that is
good: they are good by virtue of participating in the Good (see especially Republic
505a3–4).6 In order to have this causal power, the Form of the Good must itself
be good, and one can only imagine that the goodness of it and the other Forms is
supreme, as a number of passages in the dialogues suggest (see, for example, Phaedo
74d5–8, 75a11–b3, Republic 508e–509b).7 If this is correct, it is no wonder that
knowing and contemplating the Good are the ultimate bliss, as Plato implies (see,
for example, Republic 519c5–6, 580d–588a) — not just gratifying but profoundly
fulfilling.
As Plato sees it, there is also another connection between happiness and
knowing the Forms. It is that knowing them is both necessary and sufficient for
being virtuous, while being virtuous is necessary for being happy. (Plato may even
believe that virtue is sufficient for happiness.8) I will take these claims in order.
First, Plato thinks that knowledge of the Forms is necessary for virtue in the
sense that no one is virtuous (or fully virtuous, at least) unless they know the
Forms. One reason he holds this view is that he believes that someone who knows
the Form of the Good, for example, knows the nature of goodness, and thus sees
what makes something good, such that they can reliably discern between those
actions that are good and those that are not and, in turn, be in position to act well.
arguments do. For surveys of the debate, see, for example, Daniel S. Werner, Myth and Philosophy
in Plato’s “Phaedrus” (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 9–13; and Catalin Partenie,
“Introduction,” in Plato’s Myths, ed. Catalin Partenie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009),
5–21. To show that Plato thinks the Forms would be humanly unreachable, Jonas quotes Phaedo 66d7–e6
(“Three Misunderstandings of Plato’s Theory of Moral Education,” 321). But that passage is not clear-cut.
By contrasting it with other parts of the Phaedo, such as 72e3–78b3 and 78b4–84b4, we can say that
Socrates is just hyperbolic in it. Regarding this point, see Gerson, From Plato to Platonism, 163–165,
and F. C. White, “Socrates, Philosophers and Death: Two Contrasting Arguments in Plato’s Phaedo,”
Classical Quarterly 56, no. 2 (2006): 449n24, both of which contain other references. There are similar
points to make about passages such as Phaedrus 278d3–6. Incidentally, Jonas does think that one purpose
of the dialogues is to convey views that Plato endorses, views which are more or less on the surface of
the text (see “Three Misunderstandings of Plato’s Theory of Moral Education,” 316n25). In this section,
accordingly, I assume that the dialogues have that purpose.
6. I leave this vague on purpose. Interpreters have disagreed about which of the following Plato has in
mind: formal causation, efficient causation, final causation, or all three. See D. T. J. Bailey, “Platonic
Causes Revisited,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 52, no. 1 (2014): 15–32, for discussion and
references.
7. Richard Kraut also is right to cite Republic 476b, 480a, 484b, 490a–b, 500c, and 501d, wherein the
Forms are the proper objects of love. Richard Kraut, “The Defense of Justice in Plato’s Republic,” in
The Cambridge Companion to Plato, ed. Richard Kraut (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992),
334n19.
8. If so, he thinks it is sufficient in the sense that, if you are virtuous, you will be happy. Julia Annas
and Martha Nussbaum are among those who hold that he thinks this. Julia Annas, Platonic Ethics, Old
and New (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); and Martha Craven Nussbaum, “Aristotle on
Emotions and Rational Persuasion,” in Essays on Aristotle’s “Rhetoric,” ed. Amélie Rorty (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1996), 313.
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Someone who does not know the nature of goodness is far more likely to make
an error in judgment and, in turn, to act poorly.9 Moreover, if they, by chance, have
the correct views about goodness, they might end up losing them, since someone
might convince them that their views are false. If you lack knowledge of the Good,
then you must ultimately reason from hypotheses, in Plato’s language (Republic
510b ff), meaning hunches that are resilient but unsubstantiated, such that, at least
in principle, someone can talk you out of them. Though you might have reasons
for many of your views (and reasons for those reasons, and so on), one or more
of your reasons is inevitably only postulated, and thus all of them can slip from
your grasp. The situation is different if you know the Good. The Forms are what
is, or, more colloquially, they are what is real; their analog is the sun in Plato’s
famous allegory of the cave.10 And the Form of the Good is that on account of
which they are and on account of which they are knowable (Republic 508e–509b).
Accordingly, knowledge of the Good is as stable as knowledge can be: since, for
example, its object is the very source of knowability, it is not something you can
lose, and rightly so, either because it is undoubtable, because it is self–confirming,
or because it consists in part of reasons that cannot be refuted. Thus, virtuous
people know the Form of the Good, since by knowing it they will always have
their power to recognize how to act virtuously.11
These are reasons Plato can offer, and there is a lot he can say in defense of
them. If, for example, there is such a thing as the Form of the Good, it is easy to
imagine that it is, indeed, what makes the world knowable. Not just according to
Plato, but in fact, “goodness is fundamentally about intelligibility,” as one scholar
puts it; “it is the evaluative term in which we make sense of our actions, the actions
of others, and the world.”12 For example, no one’s behavior can make sense to us
unless we suppose that they are pursuing something that, in their mind, is worth
achieving. And insofar as they think it is worth achieving, it is something of value
to them, something which in that respect they consider good, supposing goodness
need not be moral purity, for example, but can be just what is beneficial, useful, or
the like.
9. Compare with, especially, Republic 505e3–5, 506c–d; contrast with Meno 97b9–10, though also see
c6–8. Annas questions how useful the Form of the Good is supposed to be (Platonic Ethics, Old and
New, chap. 5). There are replies in, among other places, Chris Bobonich, “What’s the Good of Knowing
the Forms?,” in Philosophy and Political Power in Antiquity, ed. Cinzia Arruzza and Dmitri Nikulin
(Leiden, MA: Brill, 2016), 67–93; and Andrea Wilson Nightingale, Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek
Philosophy: Theoria in Its Cultural Context (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 127–131.
10. On the most obvious reading of Republic 475e–480a, what Socrates and his interlocutors call “what
is” is being; what they call “what both is and is not” is between being and not-being; and what they call
“what is not” is not-being. On this interpretation and two of its defensible competitors, see David C. Lee,
“Interpreting Plato’s Republic: Knowledge and Belief,” Philosophy Compass 5, no. 10 (2010): 854–864,
which contains references.
11. For other reasons to think that knowledge is, for Plato, necessary for virtue, see Christopher Bobonich,
Plato’s Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 43 with
489n45; and Terence Irwin, Plato’s Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 231–235.
12. Melissa Lane, Eco-Republic: What the Ancients Can Teach Us about Ethics, Virtue, and Sustainable
Living (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 134. The next two sentences paraphrase Lane.
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Let me move, then, to the next point. Plato thinks that knowledge of the
Forms is sufficient for virtue in the sense that you will be virtuous as long
as you know the Forms. In his view, if you know the Form of the Good, for
example, you cannot help but live in accordance with it, such that who you
are and what you do are shaped by it. There are at least two reasons to think
that he accepts this. One is that his Socrates nearly says it at times (see, for
example, Republic 500d1–2, 501d7–9). More important is a passage in the Republic
where Socrates describes the good as “what every soul pursues and for the sake
of which it does everything it does” (505e1–2).13 The idea there, as elsewhere in
Plato, is that the good is what we are really after, and the only reason we ever
pursue anything else is that we mistake it for what is good. In other words, it is
strictly because we are ignorant of the good that we fail to live it out (505e2–5).14
13. Admittedly, the phrase there can be translated simply as “for the sake of
which it takes all pains,” to paraphrase A. W. Price, Virtue and Reason in Plato and Aristotle (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 277. But I think the immediate context, especially 505b5–6
together with e2–5, favors my translation. Translations of this sort have often been thought to clash
with Republic 4, but certain scholars have argued compellingly that they do not; for a summary
and references, see Rachel Singpurwalla, “Reasoning with the Irrational: Moral Psychology in the
Protagoras,” Ancient Philosophy 26, no. 2 (2006): 256n16. Like Gabriela Carone, I believe that, in
the Republic, Plato denies the possibility of any akratic action, including not only that which is
contrary to one’s knowledge of what is best, but also that which is contrary to one’s belief about it
(Gabriela Roxana Carone, “Akrasia in the Republic: Does Plato Change his Mind?,” Oxford Studies in
Ancient Philosophy 20 [2001]: 107–148). One can argue, though, as Thomas Gardner does, that Plato
denies the possibility of the former, but accepts the possibility of the latter, even while holding that
all desires are good-dependent (Thomas Gardner, “Socrates and Plato on the Possibility of Akrasia,”
Southern Journal of Philosophy 40, no. 2 [2002]: 191–210). For a recent statement of the view that
Plato accepts the possibility of both sorts of akratic action in the Republic, see Christopher Bobonich,
“Agency in Plato’s Republic,” in Oxford Handbooks Online (2017), https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/
view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935314.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199935314-e-7, which contains other
references.
14. Perhaps the true object of our desire is not just goodness but the Form of the Good: the Symposium
(209e–212a) says that the Form of Beauty is what we want, and Beauty therein is analogous to the
Good in the Republic. More vexing is the part of the Republic (519c–521b) where Socrates says that
young philosophers in training, once they have come to know the Forms, will have to be compelled
to return to the cave to rule in the city, as justice requires them to (for example, 519e–521b). That
passage has troubled scholars, and it poses a problem for me if it means that the young philosophers,
even after knowing the Forms, will not be motivated enough on their own to do what is just. I think
it does not mean this, though. In brief, the compulsion to rule is, in my view, internal to the young
philosophers, and it is overwhelmingly strong because of their knowledge of the Forms. In taking this
view, I follow commentators such as Irwin (Plato’s Ethics, chap. 18) and Kraut (“The Defense of Justice
in Plato’s Republic,” 327–329), but I should stress that acting on the compulsion, as I see it, will not
lead the young philosophers to sacrifice their happiness. (It is problematic to say that it will, as certain
other scholars have emphasized.) Rather, the happiness they will enjoy after returning to the cave is
the greatest happiness available to them. My reason is that, since justice requires that they rule, they
could stay outside the cave only if they let their souls be governed by one of its baser parts instead of
by reason, and then they would suffer from being unjust, the way Republic 8 and 9 warn that all unjust
souls do. In saying this, I imply that, ultimately, the urge to stay outside the cave would come only from
one of the baser parts of the soul; and one can object that the Republic suggests otherwise at 519c4–6
and 520e1–521b11. But I think there is a way to accommodate both of these passages, as well as the
ones which indicate that the compulsion comes from the city’s founders rather than from within the
young philosophers themselves. On all these passages, see Christopher Buckels, “Compulsion to Rule in
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An implication is that, if we know what the good is, we will aim at it without
fail.15
These views, too, have a lot in their favor. Take, for example, the idea that
all our actions aim at the good. It is hard to reject that point fundamentally while
still allowing that our evaluative judgments are connected to our motivations and
actions. And to deny a connection of that sort is to face considerable challenges,
at least if one wants to say that human beings act freely rather than simply under
compulsion.16
Consider, finally, the idea that virtue is necessary for happiness. Plato may
have a number of reasons for taking this stance. The most obvious, perhaps,
emerges in the discussion of unjust souls in Republic 8 and 9. One thought
there is that, at root, virtue involves recognizing something of value beyond
your own desires and tailoring them to it. Left alone, they will eventually over-
whelm you, since they tend to grow only stronger and harder to satisfy. When
they reach full strength, they lead to profound frustration, both for you and
the people around you. These are empirical claims, of course, and the Repub-
lic asserts them more than it defends them. But we can see their force even
just by observing our own mental lives and the tendencies each of us displays.
Everyone has at least had the experience of indulging a desire only to see it then
grow stronger.
To be sure, Plato recognizes limits to what knowing the Forms can do for
us: he might concede to Aristotle that it will not fully equip you to practice
medicine or be a carpenter, for example.17 If Plato believes those activities are
teachable, perhaps he thinks that the know-how they require is an additional aim
of education, separate from knowledge of the Forms. But if so, he takes the former
aim to be secondary to the latter. Socrates claims at one point in the Republic that,
unless one has knowledge of the Form of the Good, all other knowledge, even the
Plato’s Republic,” Apeiron 46, no. 1 (2013): 63–83; and Eric Brown, “Justice and Compulsion for Plato’s
Philosopher-Rulers,” Ancient Philosophy 20, no. 1 (2000): 5ff.
15. Republic 518d9–11 does indicate that habituation and practice are necessary (and perhaps that they
are sufficient) for the virtues of courage, justice, and temperance, as Jonas emphasizes (see “Three
Misunderstandings of Plato’s Theory of Moral Education,” 306). But the habituation and practice required
for knowing the Forms instill those virtues as a byproduct of preparing us to gain knowledge or to follow
the person who has it. And it is only a byproduct. Plato may even view the moral virtues as less significant
than the intellectual virtues; see, for example, Dominic Scott, Levels of Argument: A Comparative Study
of Plato’s “Republic” and Aristotle’s “Nicomachean Ethics” (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015),
81n25; and David Sedley, “The Ideal of Godlikeness,” in Plato, vol. 2: Ethics, Politics, Religion, and
the Soul, ed. Gail Fine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 322–323. This is one consequence of
Republic 518d9–e1, and it must inform our interpretation of passages such as 395c3–d3 and 522a3–9,
both of which Jonas quotes in Mark E. Jonas, “Plato’s Anti-Kohlbergian Program for Moral Education,”
Journal of Philosophy of Education 50, no. 2 (2016): 207.
16. See, for example, Sergio Tenenbaum, “The Judgment of a Weak Will,” Philosophy and Phenomeno-
logical Research 59, no. 4 (1999): 885ff; and Sarah Buss, “Weakness of Will,” Pacific Philosophical
Quarterly 78, no. 1 (1997): 26–31.
17. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1097a8–13.
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fullest share of it, is of no benefit (505a). And this claim, like the others, has a
lot behind it, such as a point Socrates makes in Plato’s Euthydemus (279a–282c),
where he says that all kinds of knowledge (in fact, all resources whatsoever) are of
no help unless you know how to use them, or which ends to put them toward that
are good. In fact, Socrates implies that, if anything, having them without knowing
how to use them is worse than not having them at all, since they enable you to
do greater harm than you could do without them. There is room to disagree with
him on this point, of course, but his view makes sense and even has a certain
appeal.
I conclude that Plato thinks knowledge of the Forms is the central aim of
education and that he has serious reasons for taking this view, reasons that are
worth considering as long as he is right to think that there are Forms. Part
of what I will do in the next section is point to a reason that Plato could
offer for saying that there are — a reason which is similar to one he names
(Republic 477c–480a, Timaeus 51d–e) but which draws in part on contemporary
epistemology.
Forms and Nonrepresentational Knowledge
Just now I argued, in effect, that the Forms are deeply important to Plato. I will
add that not only is it accurate to say that they are, but it also is advantageous.
Here is one reason this is so.
First, once we say it, there are robust models of knowledge that we can
ascribe to Plato.18 According to one of them, for example, the objects of all
knowledge are Forms, which, in his terminology, are essence (or being: ),19
and essence is also what human persons are. The meaning of that claim is
involved, and, happily, there is no need to go into it here. The important
point is that, on this model, there is identity between Forms and us such
that we can achieve oneness with them and, in turn, knowledge of them that
is nonrepresentational insofar as it consists of unmediated cognitive access
to them.
The impulse is to ask why one would want to ascribe such a view to Plato, since
it not only is eccentric but also can seem patently false. Oddly enough, though,
there turns out to be considerable force behind it, particularly because of modern
epistemology’s discovery of the Gettier problem, as it is called, and the extent to
which epistemologists struggled to solve it in the decades following its discovery.
The significance of the Gettier problem is that it poses a difficulty for the standard
analysis on which knowledge is justified true belief. This analysis is standard (or
18. The following model comes from Gerson, in particular, though I greatly simplify his account. Among
his relevant works is Lloyd P. Gerson, Knowing Persons: A Study in Plato (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003).
19. On the claim in the Republic that the Form of the Good is “beyond” or “above essence”
( 509b8), see especially Lloyd P. Gerson, Ancient Epistemology (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2009), 28.
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was) for the obvious reason: it can seem clear that knowledge involves true belief,
and it is natural to think the belief must be justified, since otherwise, perhaps,
nothing ensures that it is true. The problem is that we can imagine cases where a
belief is justified and nevertheless is true just by chance, such that it apparently
does not amount to knowledge.
Suppose, for example, that my friend tells me my car has been stolen, and
with justification I believe her. Suppose, further, that she does not believe the
car is missing — she is only playing a trick on me — but, as luck would
have it, the car in fact has been stolen. In that case, I have a belief that is
true and justified, but it is true only by chance, and thus it seems not to be
knowledge.
Epistemologists worked for years to repair the standard analysis so that it
would accommodate cases like that one; for example, they tried to find some-
thing besides justification that could be added to belief in order to guarantee
its truth. Arguably, they never quite succeeded, and the reason is that the stan-
dard analysis is irreparable and has to be scrapped entirely. As many epistemol-
ogists now agree, it does not work to analyze knowledge as true belief, plus
some other factors that make it knowledge.20 In fact, knowledge cannot be in
any part belief. After all, if knowledge involves belief, it involves representing
the objects of knowledge, whereupon there is always a chance of misrepresenting
them; yet knowledge cannot be false — or, at least, to say that it can, as cer-
tain epistemologists have, is just to stipulate a definition of the word or con-
cept “knowledge” instead of describing something that genuinely exists.21 Thus,
rather than representing the objects of knowledge, a knower must be one with
them. And Forms are the only sorts of objects that a knower can be one with
and that are illuminating enough to be what there is to be known.22 This, at
least, is a very plausible line of thought, regardless of whether it is ultimately
correct.
Accordingly, a Plato who believes in Forms can challenge those of us who
hold views about what the aims of education are. Philosophers of education and
others have debated which goods education aims at; some have held, for example,
that teachers should aim to instill true belief, whereas others have said that the
20. Timothy Williamson has been especially influential on this point. His relevant works include
Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
21. Here I paraphrase Lloyd P. Gerson, “Platonic Knowledge and the Standard Analysis,” International
Journal of Philosophical Studies 14, no. 4 (2006): 456–457.
22. Contrast Forms with Aristotelian immanent universals, for example. Arguably, the latter cannot
adequately account for the values we find. In Aristotle’s world, organisms each strive toward the
respective ends that are internal to them, yet what explains how these organisms are all part of an ecology
or kosmos (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1075a12–25) such that their ends are not at odds with one another?
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goal should be rationality or certain virtues.23 Quite possibly, the debate has
been too confined, since if there is nonrepresentational knowledge of the sort
just described, there is a good chance that it is the aim of education, or at least
one of its aims. The idea of involving Plato in the discussion is less strange
than it might seem at first. To welcome him into it, one need not think he
will prove to be correct: one can simply suspect that wrestling with him will
turn out to be productive, particularly because of how different his sensibilities
are from ours. As a number of historiographers have emphasized, thinkers in
history are useful for making us reconsider the assumptions that we are prone to
take for granted. When we are in agreement with one another on certain points,
their truth can seem so obvious that we do not think to defend them, and we
overlook objections to them that we would do well to consider, even if the result of
considering them is simply that we refine the views we already hold or sharpen our
arguments for them.24 There is a lot to that notion, and it is borne out in significant
ways in philosophy and various other disciplines. For example, many political
theorists have found it constructive to address the arguments in Plato’s Republic
for aristocracy, even though most political theorists today are firmly committed
to democracy.25
Of course, we might think that, once we have conceived of a view, it makes no
difference whether we ascribe it to Plato — for example, that once we have the idea
of nonrepresentational knowledge, we might as well detach the idea from him and
simply debate it on its own terms. But as historiographers have stressed, it often
is helpful to “think with” a historical figure, as they put it: to ascribe a view to
that figure and try to reconstruct the reasons he or she has for it, or could have,
rather than reasons we imagine independently of the person’s writings.26 When
we do so, we have to work under the constraints the historical figure imposes —
every claim we attribute to the person has to mesh with all of his or her other
23. For summaries and references, see Kristján Kristjánsson, Flourishing as the Aim of Education: A
Neo-Aristotelian View (New York: Routledge, 2019), chap. 2; and Lani Watson, “The Epistemology of
Education,” Philosophy Compass 11, no. 3 (2016): 151ff.
24. See, for example, Maria Rosa Antognazza, “The Benefit to Philosophy of the Study of Its History,”
British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23, no. 1 (2015): 161–184; and Yitzhak Melamed, “Chari-
table Interpretations and the Political Domestication of Spinoza, or, Benedict in the Land of the Secular
Imagination,” in Philosophy and Its History: Aims and Methods in the Study of Early Modern Philoso-
phy, ed. Mogens Lærke, Justin E. H. Smith, and Eric Schliesser (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013),
258–277.
25. See, for example, David M. Estlund, “Why Not Epistocracy?,” in Desire, Identity, and Existence:
Essays in Honor of T. M. Penner, ed. Naomi Reshotko (Edmonton, Canada: Academic Printing and
Publishing, 2003), 53–69 (revised and reprinted as “Why Not an Epistocracy of the Educated?,” in
Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008],
206–222); and Robert B. Talisse, Democracy after Liberalism: Pragmatism and Deliberative Politics
(New York: Routledge, 2005), 99ff.
26. See, for example, Richard Sorabji, “Ideas Leap Barriers: The Value of Historical Studies to Philos-
ophy,” in Maieusis: Essays in Ancient Philosophy in Honour of Myles Burnyeat, ed. Dominic Scott
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 384; and Ryan Nichols, “Why Is the History of Philosophy Worth
Our Study?,” Metaphilosophy 37, no. 1 (2006): 46–47.
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claims — so, in the process of trying to trace the person’s thoughts, we can think
of inferences, among other things, that would not have occurred to us otherwise,
whereupon we can end up with sturdier arguments against our views and, thus,
better means of strengthening them. In engaging Plato, for example, we can find
greater resistance to our views about knowledge and, in turn, to our views about
the aims of education.
I have offered only an example of why it is advantageous to say that the Forms
are important to Plato. There are other examples one could name. But I think this
one, even by itself, attests that there is a lot to be gained.
Formless Ineffabilism
I shift now to consider an interpretation of Plato that one philosopher of
education, Mark Jonas, has recently offered. Like the interpretation I just discussed,
it is ineffabilist, as I will put it, meaning that it says that, for Plato, the sort
of knowledge most worth having cannot be fully expressed in words. Unlike
that other interpretation, though, it denies that the objects of this knowledge are
Forms, in his view.27 I will call this interpretation Formless ineffabilism and will
argue that it is problematic — more specifically, that it is problematic relative to
philosophy of education. To start with, I will note an obstacle for ineffabilism in
general, one that certain sorts of ineffabilism can manage but that causes trouble
for Formless ineffabilism, in particular.
The main evidence in favor of ineffabilism of any kind is in the Seventh Letter,
an epistle ascribed to Plato. Many scholars have doubted that he is in fact its author,
and here I will leave open the question of whether he is. The following passage in
the letter is clearly significant, though, especially if Plato is its author:
There is no writing of mine about this matter [namely, the knowledge of mine that I hold most
dear], nor will there ever be; for this knowledge is not something that can be put into words
like other sciences, but after long-continued intercourse between teacher and pupil, in joint
pursuit of the subject, suddenly, like light flashing forth when a fire is kindled, it is born in
the soul and straightaway nourishes itself. (341c4–d2)28
27. See Mark E. Jonas, “Plato on Dialogue as a Method for Cultivating the Virtues,” in The Theory and
Practice of Virtue Education, ed. Tom Harrison and David Ian Walker (New York: Routledge, 2018), 87ff
in light of note 1 above. Like Jonas, Mintz accepts ineffabilism (see Plato: Images, Aims, and Practices of
Education, 29), though he and Jonas may have different ideas about what the objects of Plato’s ineffable
knowledge are and the extent to which it is expressible. For Jonas, perhaps, it is simply nonpropositional
knowledge of how to live well, and one can make statements that capture some features of its content;
see Mark E. Jonas, “The Role of Practice and Habituation in Socrates’ Theory of Ethical Development,”
British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26, no. 2 (2018): 987–1005, especially 1003. For Mintz,
conceivably, its objects are ineffable propositions, and it is wholly inexpressible in words.
28. The Greek that is translated here as “is not something that can be put into words like other sciences”
is Myles Burnyeat’s translation seems to me legitimate and
maybe even preferable: “It cannot be conveyed [to someone else] by words in anything like the same
way as other studies can” (Myles Burnyeat and Michael Frede, The Seventh Platonic Letter: A Seminar,
ed. Dominic Scott [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015], 166). I offer a more conventional translation
here just to keep from loading the dice.
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This passage suggests not only the limits of writing, but the inadequacy of all
words, even spoken ones,29 so it can seem to show definitively that ineffabilism is
correct.
One problem, however, is that the passage is in tension with certain parts of
Plato’s dialogues. Consider, for example, the following exchange in the Republic:
Socrates: Do you call dialectical someone who is able to give a logos of the being of each
thing But insofar as he’s unable to give a logos of
something, either to himself or to another, do you deny that he has any understanding of it?
Glaucon: How could I do anything else?
Socrates: Then the same applies to the Good. Unless someone can separate out the
Form of the Good from everything else and distinguish it by means of a logos, and
surviving every examination as if in a battle , striving to
judge things not in accordance with opinion but in accordance with being, he comes through all
this with his logos still intact, you’ll say that he doesn’t know the Good itself or any other good?
And if he gets hold of some image of it, you’ll say that it’s through opinion, not knowledge,
for he is dreaming and asleep throughout his present life, and before he wakes up here, he will
arrive in Hades and go to sleep forever?
Glaucon: Yes, by god, I’ll certainly say all of that. (534b3–d2)30
As it is conceived in the Republic, knowledge of the Form of the Good is the be-all
and end-all knowledge, and on its face the Republic indicates that we do not have
knowledge of that sort unless we can articulate what we know, provide arguments
for our claims, and reply satisfactorily to every objection that can be raised. The
implication is that the most valuable sort of knowledge is fully articulable; this is
implied even by the claim that the knower can give arguments, since a proposition
can be the conclusion of an argument only if the proposition can be conveyed in
words. So passages such as this one offset the Seventh Letter, and they offset it
enough that, if they and it are our only evidence, the texts underdetermine which
interpretation is correct, ineffabilism or one of its competitors.
The obvious solution is to look beyond the Seventh Letter and find something
else in Plato’s writings that favors ineffabilism. However, although there is addi-
tional evidence,31 it is available only to interpreters who say that Plato believes in
29. Among other reasons, the term that I have translated “can be put into words” ( 341c5) means
simply that; it does not mean “expressible in writing.” I paraphrase K. M. Sayre, “Review of Plato and the
Foundations of Metaphysics: A Work on the Theory of the Principles and Unwritten Doctrines of Plato
with a Collection of the Fundamental Documents by Hans Joachim Krämer,” Ancient Philosophy 13,
no. 1 (1993): 172, who offers additional evidence. For example, he points to the phrase
(“speaking or writing”) at 343d4–5.
30. See also Apology 22b3–c8; Gorgias 465a2–5, 500e4–501a3; Meno 98a; Phaedo 76b8–c3; Phaedrus
278c5–6; Republic 531e3–5; Theaetetus 187b2–210b3; and Timaeus 51e3–4.
31. Take, for example, Socrates’s claim in the Republic that each Form is “one” ( see 476a3, 479a4,
507b5–6). Arguably, Socrates means both that each Form is incomposite and that it is isolated from
other Forms (since it is wholly and purely self-predicated), so he implies that Forms are indefinable,
since nothing can be definable without having either connections among its parts or relations to other
things. If so, knowledge is ineffable (or, at least, ultimate knowledge is) as long as Forms are its objects,
as they of course are if Plato believes in Forms.
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Forms; for interpreters who say otherwise, there is not much to find. Of the various
letters attributed to Plato, the Seventh Letter is the only one that is a real candi-
date for being authentic, so the extra evidence would have to come from Plato’s
dialogues. And the dialogues give us little that is helpful once we suppose that
they are Formless: though many of them accommodate ineffabilism, they accom-
modate anti-ineffabilism, too, such that one has to read them through the lens of
the Seventh Letter in order to accept ineffabilism.
Plato’s Lysis is a case in point, I think, and I imagine that Jonas would agree,
despite what he has written about it. Here is the key passage in it, one that opens
with a statement from Socrates that is part of a long discussion about the nature
of love:
“And if one person desires another … or loves him passionately, he would not desire him or
love him passionately or as a friend unless he somehow belonged to his beloved either in his
soul or in some characteristic, habit, or aspect of his soul.”
“Certainly,” said Menexenus, but Lysis said nothing.
“All right,” [Socrates] said, “what belongs to us by nature has shown itself to us as something
we must love.”
“It looks like it,” [Menexenus] said.
“Then the genuine and not the pretended lover must be befriended by his boy.”
Lysis and Menexenus barely somehow nodded assent, but Hippothales beamed every color in
the rainbow in his delight. (221e7–222b2)
Jonas claims that this passage “provides … an image” of how one achieves the
ineffable knowledge mentioned in the Seventh Letter.32 This idea, besides being
intriguing, is certainly plausible, and it is plausible precisely for the reason Jonas
proposes, which is that Lysis is silent here because he has an “epiphany,” meaning
“an awakening or a spontaneous realization that … is not entailed by the logical
argumentation Socrates employs.”33 But even if Lysis does have an epiphany, it is
not clear from the text that he comes to understand anything substantial, such as
the nature of love, much less that his discovery is inexpressible to any extent.34
(Perhaps all he realizes, for example, is that he should stop ignoring Hippothales, an
older boy who passionately pursues him as a lover.) So, although the Lysis allows
Jonas’s interpretation, the Lysis itself provides no reason to prefer it. The text thus
is flexible in a way that is characteristic of Plato’s dialogues and that is exacerbated
once we suppose they are Formless. Especially once we decide that they are, the
challenge in interpreting them is to find passages that can determine the correct
reading instead of being determined by it.
32. Jonas, “Plato on Dialogue as a Method for Cultivating the Virtues,” 90.
33. Mark E. Jonas, “Education for Epiphany: The Case of Plato’s Lysis,” Educational Theory 65, no. 1
(2015): 42n12.
34. In fact, neither is it clear that he has an epiphany. Maybe the only reason he falls silent is that he
anticipates and dislikes Socrates’s conclusion. See especially Terry Penner and Christopher Rowe, Plato’s
“Lysis” (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 168.
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Of course, like the passage in the Lysis, the Republic passage quoted previously
is in the dialogues, and it, too, is flexible: there are ways to redescribe it so that it
does not mean that knowledge can be conveyed fully in words.35 It might seem,
then, that the solution is to bend the Republic passage so that it fits with the
Seventh Letter. The problem is that, if Plato does not believe in Forms (or might
not), we can instead bend the Seventh Letter so that it fits with the passage in
the Republic, and there is no decisive reason to bend the one rather than the other.
After all, the dialogues, at the least, strongly suggest that Plato believes in Forms —
they encourage us to assume that he does — so if he does not, he is highly strategic
as an author: he writes less to convey his beliefs to his readers than to have some
other effect on them, whatever it is. This matters because, if he is as cagey as this
implies, we cannot take the dialogues at face value, in which case neither can we
take the Seventh Letter at face value. In antiquity, a letter of its kind was “a public
presentation and interpretation of a position, not a personal outpouring from one
individual to another,” as Julia Annas has put it.36 Accordingly, as she and others
have said, Plato might be no more forthcoming in the Seventh Letter than in the
dialogues, supposing he is its author.37
Moreover, it is easy enough to imagine that he would be no more forthcoming
in the Seventh Letter, particularly since it contains the remark I quoted above. No
matter how Plato conceives of knowledge, he plainly wants us to inquire, in part
by weighing arguments and counterarguments; this, at least, we can gather from
the dialogues.38 Yet inquiry is difficult and time-consuming, and there is for many
people a deep temptation to avoid it. Further, the way most people avoid it is by
telling themselves that they already have knowledge such that they need not seek
it. (At least, Plato apparently thinks that this is the common tactic, since it is the
favorite one among Socrates’s interlocutors in the dialogues.) The way to hold them
accountable is to do what Socrates does with his interlocutors and what Plato often
does with his readers: confront them with questions that they struggle to answer,
and suggest to them that they don’t have knowledge until they are able to answer
them — in other words, until they can defend their claims. If you commend to
them the idea that there is knowledge which is ineffable, you imply that there is
35. See especially Francisco J. Gonzalez, Dialectic and Dialogue: Plato’s Practice of Philosophical
Inquiry (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1998), 239–240; and Kenneth M. Sayre, Plato’s
Literary Garden: How to Read a Platonic Dialogue (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press,
1995), 194–195. Roughly, Gonzalez and Sayre say that the point of passages like this one is just that
people who have ineffable knowledge do not fall prey to the limitations of language and, in turn, do
injustice to what they know; in fact, they talk in a way that conduces to ineffable knowledge among
their listeners.
36. Annas, Platonic Ethics, Old and New, 75.
37. See, for example, Ruby Blondell, The Play of Character in Plato’s Dialogues (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002), 38; and Charles L. Griswold Jr., “Commentary on Sayre,” Proceedings of the
Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 9, no. 1 (1993): 205.
38. It is generally agreed that, even if Plato thinks knowledge is ineffable, he believes that we need to
inquire this way in order to better our chances of reaching knowledge. See, for example, Sayre, Plato’s
Literary Garden, 90–91.
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knowledge which is indefensible, and thereby you give them an out: you invite
them to fancy that they have knowledge already, just as they hoped, and that they
thus are off the hook. So — and here is the point — there is reason to think that
believing knowledge is ineffable would not be sufficient motivation for Plato to
say that it is, especially if he is so cagey as an author.
Why, then, would he make the remark in the Seventh Letter? Perhaps in order
to tease readers into looking beyond his dialogues. By dangling the suggestion that
the dialogues are inadequate, he would keep readers from assuming that because
they had read the dialogues, they already had answers or knew Plato’s philosophical
views such that they need not inquire or enter his Academy. There is a danger that
they would be complacent after reading the dialogues, just as there is a danger that
they would be complacent beforehand or in the course of reading them, and Plato
might simply think the former danger is greater than the latter. Of course, I am
only speculating; if he is the author of the Seventh Letter, maybe he does make the
pivotal remark in order to disclose what he believes. But there is a chance, at least,
that he does not, enough of a chance that the evidence from the Seventh Letter
does not outweigh the evidence from the Republic and other Platonic dialogues.
The upshot is that, once we reject the view that Plato believes in Forms, we
reach an impasse: we are unable to say that ineffabilism is more likely than its
competitors to be true — true in the sense that it accurately describes Plato’s
writings, his intentions behind them, or the like. As a result, if we are to prefer
Formless ineffabilism, we have to do so for what philosophers call prudential rea-
sons, that is, reasons to think not that Formless ineffabilism is more accurate than
the alternatives, but that it is more useful, meaning more conducive to our ends.
The distinction among philosophers is between prudential reasons and epistemic
reasons. An epistemic reason to believe something (for example, a claim about
Plato) is reason to think it is true, whereas a prudential reason to perform some
action (for example, to adopt an interpretation) is reason to think that performing
this action will further our ends. When epistemic reasons cannot decide an issue,
we must resort to prudential reasons if we are to favor any views over others.
All of this is significant since the prudential reasons to favor Formless ineffa-
bilism turn out to be relatively weak. The problem is that there are interpretations
more useful to philosophy of education than Formless ineffabilism is. One, for
example, is the interpretation described in the previous section, an interpretation
that says, in part, that Plato believes in Forms. That interpretation gives Plato a
vigorous metaphysics and epistemology, whereupon he can pose resistance to our
views about the aims of education and help us refine our thoughts about them. It
is hard to see how Formless ineffabilism would be able to do anything comparable.
Conclusion
In this essay, I have argued that Plato’s views about Forms play a central role
in his educational philosophy. I claimed that this reading not only is accurate, but
also is advantageous because of what it can do for philosophy of education. In the
same vein, I contended that Formless ineffabilism is problematic. Unless Plato
believes in Forms, I argued, ineffabilism is no more likely than its competitors to
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be true. So, if we are to accept Formless ineffabilism, we have to do so for prudential
reasons rather than epistemic reasons. Yet the prudential reasons to favor Formless
ineffabilism are relatively weak, since there are other interpretations that are more
useful than it is. For example, there is the interpretation I described in section two
of this essay, according to which Plato believes in nonrepresentational knowledge
of Forms, such that he can stir productive debate. All told, I have cast Plato less
as an ally than as a provocateur, someone to look to more for a challenge than
for inspiration. In this respect, my essay is unusual compared to most recent
discussions of him among philosophers of education. But if I am right, a provocative
Plato is the sort who can help us the most.
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